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SPECIAL COMMENT
FEEDBACK FROM THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: IS THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE AN ALBATROSS AROUND THE

JUDICIAL NECK?
By

STEPHEN E.

Goyru[EB*

INTRODUCTION

The exclusionary rule, which renders illegally obtained
evidence inadmissible in criminal trials, was adopted for the
federal courts in 19141 and applied to the states in 1961.2 After
its adoption for the federal courts, it was felt that the exclusionary rule would serve as a lesson in the cause of liberty.3 By the
time it was adopted for the states, the possibility that it would
poison constitutional adjudication and contribute to a general
disrespect for law, order, and the Bill of Rights may have been
felt but was not well articulated. Although alternatives have
been suggested 4 and criticism has been levied, 5 the exclusionary rule persists.
This Special Comment will explore the goals of the exclusionary rule, consider the extent to which these goals have been
met, discuss the effectiveness of the major alternative and
suggest an improvement.
* Associate Professor, Albany Law School. B.A. 1962, Princeton; LL.B. 1965,
Yale.
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(Olmstead was overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 352 (1967)).
See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MNN.
L. REV. 493 (1955).
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926); WiGMORE, EviDENcE, § 2184 (3d ed.
1940).
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THE REASON FOR THE RULE

The fourth amendment was designed to limit the arbitrary
power of government.' Unrestrained government power could
be abused in a variety of ways. The government might seize
information about people-their politics, religion, friends,
likes, dislikes, or business plans-and misuse it. The burden of
bail or imprisonment might be imposed for partisan or petty
personal reasons or because of prejudice and hostility. Property
might unjustifiably be taken either temporarily or permanently.
The amendment requires that seizure and arrests be made
reasonably and that a warrant authorizing such an action be
based on information which makes it probable that the action
is justified. The proper goal of the exclusionary rule is to ensure
that law enforcement officers follow these requirements for
searches and seizures so that they cannot use their office improperly against personal or political opponents or minorities.
Most authorities believe that police behavior has improved
over the last several decades.' It is by no means clear, however,
that the exclusionary rule deters lawless behavior.' The improvement is probably the result of factors other than the exclusionary rule, such as a general social revolution which has
' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886). But see Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1976-77 (1978), in which the Court suggests that the fourth
amendment's protection against arbitrary government power is diminished when the
purpose of a search is not to obtain evidence of crime against the possessor.
I See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Justice Brandeis believed
that government should not condone lawless behavior by its own officers and that
government should set an example for others to follow. See Olmstead v. United States
277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Olmstead was overruled in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 352 (1967)).
8 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 93, 115 (Report by the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). Compare the
description of current practices and problems in A. REiss, THE POICE AND THE PUBLIC

144-56 (1971) and P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 144-45 (1969) with descriptions of earlier
practices in Ploscowe, A Modem Law of Arrest, 39 MmIN. L. REV. 473 (1955) and
Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. Ray. 479, 485 (1955).
1 The best known critque is Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure 37 U. CI. L. R. 664 (1970). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 416-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 218-21 (1960), for judicial assessments of the evidence. D.L. HoRowrrz, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 230 (1977), concludes that the results are palpable but

mixed.

1978-79]

EXCLUSIONARY RuLE

1009

demanded dignity and respect for minorities and lower socioeconomic groups.' 0 Also, the movement for racial equality,
which spawned civil rights statutes that include tort remedies," is probably responsible for increasing public tolerance
for litigation against police officers' 2-which is crucial to the
viability of alternate remedies.
There are several situations in which the exclusionary rule
is totally ineffective to control police behavior. For example,
"[w]here police, neither intending nor undertaking to prosecute, take the law in their own hands for purposes of harassment, threat, or revenge, the courts have no means of control
at all.' 3 This frequently happens in poor or high crime areas
where young men are often stopped, searched, or arrested as a
kind of display of authority, 4 or on the assumption that by
virtue of their status they are likely to have some form of contraband on their persons.' 5 The policeman's objective in such
instances is satisfied at the time of the encounter, as the harassed subject is duly impressed with the presence and zeal of
11The bulk of police violence and abuse has always been directed at people in the
lowest social and economic positions. See Rmss, supra note 8,at 144-56; Foote, supra
note 4, at 500. To assess the conclusion that improvement in police behavior is in large
part the result of changes in attitudes, compare the apparent improvement in police
behavior, see note 8 supra, with the apparent marginal effect of Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), on fourth amendment abuses, see note 9 supra. The exclusionary rule
may also have a positive effect on attitudes, partly bearing out Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In the 1960's, after
decades of official denials, Attorney General Ramsey Clark and then Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall began disclosing government wiretaps in the context of motions
to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Donner, Electric Surveillance, 2 Civ. LIB. R.
15, 25, 29 (Summer 1975). Since then government law enforcement practices have been
subjected to continued and systematic investigation and disclosure by a series of congressional committees. See, e.g., FiNAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNME AL OPERATIONS WrrH REsPECT TO INTELUGENCE Acivrrims, S. REP.No. 755,
BOOK II. 94th Cong., 2 Sess. 13 at 837-920 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SELECT
COMMITrEE].

" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985.
£2 The major cases defining the good faith defense have arisen not out of searches
and seizures but out of a school dispute, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975);
confinement in a mental hospital, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1974); and a
college campus massacre, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
13Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 163
(1948).
,1Oaks, supra note 9, at 721-22.
13Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 Mm'N.L. REv. 349, 438
(1974).
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the police." Any contraband that is found may be seized and
the person detained-with little thought of gaining convictions.
Since conviction is not a goal in this situation, the police will
lose nothing by the application of the exclusionary rule. The
possibility of a public official acting as a petty tyrant, or as the
instrument of a major tyrant, does not depend on his ability to
use evidence seized to convict someone. When the improper

motive yields a purpose to convict, it is usually more convenient to charge those minor crimes which depend on the officer's
word - breach of the peace, interfering with a police officer,
resisting arrest.'7
The exclusionary rule is similarly impotent to control police behavior when the illegal search or seizure is conducted
with the intention of injuring a reputation or controlling political activity. Some unfortunate recent examples have been tax
investigations of those who are critical of government officials, 8
the dispersal and detention of protesting crowds, "Iand the public exposure of unpopular ideas or confidential information.'"
Even if no conviction results from a baseless arrest, one's reputation or employment prospects may be damaged. In addition,
,' This kind of law enforcement is one of the major sources of anger in the black
community. Reiss argues that this is a combination of class discrimination with public
sensitivity to racial mistreatment. REiss, supra note 8, at 144-56. See also Rights Unit
Says Police Misconduct is Among South's Major Problems, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1978,
§ D at 8, col. 1.
A variable that may determine the behavior of the police in this type of situation
is the manner in which the person stopped speaks to the police. Amsterdam, supra note
15, at 416,; CHEVIGNY, supra note 8,at 137-38; A. REIss, supra note 8.
'7 P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 8,at 136-46.
,' SELECT CoMmrrrEE, supra note 10, at 837-920.
1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CML RIGHTS IN THE
UNrrED STATES, 414-15 (4th ed. 1976) (describing both the litigation arising out of the
May Day demonstrations in Washington and attempts to ban demonstrations in several other cities).
20 See Caughey, McCarthyism Rampant, in A. RErimN, THE PULSE OF FREEDOM,
155-60 (1975). Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). Patterns of FBI contact with
the media are described in 2 SELECT COMMrrTEE, supra note 10, at 225-32. Purely
political material has also been obtained and supplied to incumbent candidates. Id.
at 33, 51-54, 225; N.Y. Times, June 2, 1978, § A at 12, col. 1. The gathering and abuse
of information about sexual relations is described in DORSEN, BENDER & NEUBORNE,
supra note 19, at 194; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 5. Political animus
among law enforcement agencies has also led to official incitement to violence. See
SELECT CoMmrrTEE supra note 10, at 10-12; Improper Police Intelligence Activities, A
Report by the Extended March 1975 Cook County Grand Jury, Part IV (A) and (B).
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the fourth amendment does not protect against abuses of prosecutorial discretion.
In addition to its ineffectiveness in controlling police behavior, the exclusionary rule provides no remedy for an innocent victim of police misconduct.2 ' The exclusionary rule deals
only with an investigation aimed at conviction:
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and then only those where the search and
seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at
least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers
raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but
find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There
may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which
turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made,
about which courts do nothing, and about which we never
hear.?
The exclusionary rule was supposed to prevent that discomfort of the innocent by making mistakes useless to the police and therefore encouraging them to be careful.? This is the
only way in which the exclusionary rule could work to protect
the innocent. As noted earlier, it is difficult to tell whether the
exclusionary rule has caused an improvement in police behavior; however, it is certain that the rule has caused a number of
accused-and probably guilty-criminals to be released.
The exclusionary rule is only effective when an illegal
search yields evidence that would lead to a conviction. The rule
may not work well even in that situation. For the rule to re11Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 403 U.S. 388, 398, 410 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring). It is of course possible that incriminating evidence may be seized
improperly in an effort to use it against an innocent person. In that instance the rule
makes it easier to establish innocence.
Justice Harlan made the relation between the exclusionary rule and the interests
of the innocent clear in his dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789 (1971),
noting that the prevailing opinion's focus on the expectations and risks of
"wrongdoers" "misses the mark entirely" because the result subjects "each and every
law-abiding member of society" to the risk that secret agents will record or transmit
their most intimate conversations.
2 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
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strain the officer, it would be necessary that it prevent conviction in an otherwise solid case, that the officer be made aware
of the results of the case and the relationship of his actions in
investigating it to that result, and that he or his department
care not about arrests but about convictions. 4 On a broader
level, the reasons why defendants are released are only partly
related to the conduct of the officer. The greater the number
of these independent causes, the less responsible a policeman
feels for the releases or lost convictions.
In addition to its inability to control police behavior and
to provide a remedy for innocent parties, the exclusionary rule
has also been one of the major sources of objection by the
general public to the way our courts operate. The reason is
plain: the rule requires judges to exclude testimony from criminal trials about evidence that was obtained in violation of the
Constitution even if that evidence would help to convict a
guilty person. That hostility has caused a weakening of the
rule,2s and, by engendering sympathy for the police," may have
limited the growth of other remedies.Y Such hostility has probably also led to regressive tendencies in other areas. For example, the right to resist an illegal arrest has been substantially
restricted.2 The innocent protests of distraught citizens have
Oaks, supra note 9, at 710.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 98 S. Ct. 1954 (1978); HoRowrrz, supra
note 9, at 239. On the dilution of the rule by lower courts, see id. at 243.
2' See Erskine, The Polls: Causes of Crime, 38 PuB. OPINION Q. 288, 291, 292, 295
(1974); Erskine, The Polls: Control of Crime and Violence, 38 PuB. OPINION Q. 490
(1975); Erskine, The Polls:Politicsand Law and Order,38 PuB. OPINION Q. 622 (1975);
Reiss, Monitoring the Quality of CriminalJustice Systems, in THE HUMAN MEANING
OF SOCIAL CHANGE 395 (A. Campbell & P. Converse ed. 1972). The Harris organization
asked people if they thought "the right to sue the FBI if it publicly releases transcripts
of wiretapped conversations" should ever be suspended. Sixty-six percent said no, 20%
said yes. Letter to the author from Michael W. Kolakowski, Director, Information
Services, Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (September 23, 1977). The extremity of the
question, however, weakens its significance. See also Louis HARRIS, THE ANGUISH OF
CHANGE 178, 196 (1973) and 60 Minutes, vol. II, no. 16, as broadcast by CBS, Tuesday,
April 14, 1970. For other factors see text at notes 10-12.
1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,421-22 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). See generally P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 8, at 251; Geller, Enforcing
the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.
L.Q. 621, 692-93.
18See State v. Brothers, 445 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. 1969); Chevigny, The Right to
Resist an Illegal Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969).
24
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thus been criminalized. 29 Other regressive tendencies are apparent in the decreasing protection allowed to persons in automobiles 0 and in "stop and frisk" laws. 3' Another significant
development that may be the result of hostility toward the
exclusionary rule is the subjugation of the press to law enforcement-first in holding newsmen to be fair game for factgathering, 3 then in holding the press at the mercy of ex parte
decisions about probable cause. This hositility toward the
exclusionary rule has directed more attention toward the need
to convict criminals than the need to protect privacy.34
The Bill of Rights was designed to override popular judgments in favor of more enduring interests; things will not necessarily be better and may be much worse if the public is offended less. Thus it is dangerous and often illegitimate to make,
constitutional decisions on the basis of public reactions. Nevertheless, the question of alternatives naturally arises in the face
of severe public reaction, particularly where that reaction
undermines enforcement.
II.

TORT LIAILrrY

As AN ALTERNATIvE

A number of alternatives to the exclusionary rule have
been proposed. 35 Ultimately, however, only one remedy pro-

perly protects civil liberties: the traditional, ordinary tort
suit. 3 Also, the tort remedy may provide a healthier environ21 See City of St. Louis v. Treece, 502 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1973).

• Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
s, HoRowrrz, supra note 9, at 234; REiss, supra note 8, at 393.
32 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
By analogy, unhappiness with judicial doctrines in the area of sovereign immunity during the early nineteenth century gave impetus to the development of relatively
harsh rules of personal liability by governmental officers. See Engdahl, Immunity and
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 COLO. L. Rav. 1, 19-20 (1972).
Similarly, the recent expansion of governmental immunity doctrines should encourage
a reexamination of rules of personal liability. See generally id.
" See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449, n.21 (1976); Geller, supra note
27.
3, Richard A. Posner urges the substitution of tort liability for the exclusionary
rule. His analysis is based on general principles without examining the impact of the
defenses available or the effects of insurance on the results. In general his approach
prefers allocation of damages by fault both to a rule of strict liability and to a rule of
no liability. R. POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 384-85 (1972). The approach outlined in this article is generally consistent with Posner's views.
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ment for doctrinal development than suppression hearings. To
understand the degree to which a tort suit may substitute for
the exclusionary rule, it is necessary to turn to a consideration
of the good faith defense that is available to public officials.
The good faith defense stands as the primary doctrinal
obstacle that prevents placement of tort liability on policemen." This good faith standard for police misconduct was articulated by the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray.38 The courts
are in agreement that good faith is less than probable cause and
that it must reflect some objective standard of reasonableness: 39 "[Tihe policeman [must have] a reasonable, good
faith belief in the existence of probable cause."4 To the extent
that good faith requires less than probable cause, searches and
seizures will be uncontrolled - even searches and seizures that
would have been penalized under the exclusionary rule.
Thus, abrogation of the defense is necessary to prevent
conduct that would have beer. penalized under the exclusionary -rule. However, such an abrogation would have extremely
harsh results if law enforcement officers were held personally
liable in fourth amendment suits. Officers would be liable for
all unreasonable acts regardless of their beliefs. The trend in
the law has clearly been away from that kind of liability in
public servants," partly because public officials required to
make difficult decisions under stress occasionally make unreasonable ones.4" To the degree that errors are inevitable, placing
the burden directly on police officers will deter nothing.
31Another obstacle is public reluctance to hold police liable, an attitude fanned
by the exclusionary rule itself.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th
Cir. 1976).
10Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 593 (1973).
11 See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911 n.34 (1978); Engdahl, supra note
34, at 47-55; Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REv. 303, 328-33
(1959).
42 See G. CALABRES, THE COSTS OF AccmDENrs 109-11. In addition, it is sometimes
assumed that placing the burden on the officer will force him to struggle between his
own instinct for self-protection and a department whose rules need not take account
of the results though moderated by collective bargaining or pressure from the ranks.
In the case of direct orders to act improperly, however, liability will be softened by
sympathetic juries and the legal right to implead responsible superiors. See Gray,
supra note 41, at 322 n.116, 326.
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In addition, such liability may make the burdens of serving on the police force unreasonable in comparison to the benefits. Another pragmatic consideration is that, to the extent that
the public believes that the burden of liability falls on the
officers, juries may be unwilling to impose liabilities on police
officers. Thus, if officers are ever to be held personally liable
in any case, retention of the good faith defense may be the
necessary price of having a police force."
This position, however, sacrifices deterrence of unreasonable behavior because of the burden of unavoidable error on the
policeman." The intentional abuses described above 5 would be
minimally deterred because of the difficulty of proving bad
faith. No sanction would exist for negligence or abuse predictably found improper but arguably within the law, whether it be
arrests of demonstrators or searches of prison mail.48 Departments would be undeterred from employing practices that generated abuse47 if personal liability could be avoided.
An alternative would be to abrogate the good faith defense
and transfer liability away from the officer through the use of
insurance or governmental reimbursement. Placed in this
See G. CALADRESi, supra note 42, at 69.
It should be noted that some states have permitted liability for some time but
the effect on law enforcement and efficiency of administration has been negligible. See
Engdahl, supra note 34, at 59. Perhaps this limited effect is the result of the impact
of the exclusionary rule on the public.
11See text at notes 13-20, supra.
" Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
'7 See HoRowrrz, supra note 9, at 229-32.
" Prior to the recent decision in Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018
(1978), damages could not be collected from municipalities for constitutional violations. They were collectible from individual officers, but that remedy was, as a practical matter, inadequate. Perhaps the hositility of the present Court to the exclusionary
rule prompted this holding in Monell: the availability of a remedy against a municipal- •
ity provides an alternative sanction from that provided by the exclusionary rule. See
also Carey v. Pipus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), outlining the availability of substantial
damages for humiliation in distress but limiting such recovery to cases establishing
actual injury.
Other proposals that would aid fourth amendment tort litigation are the award of
attorney fees and the establishment of a fixed minimum recovery. Such proposals
would make these suits more attractive by providing a financial floor. See Geller, supra
note 27, at 697, 702, 710-11. Despite the importance of awarding attorney fees to private
"attorneys general," the Supreme Court held in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), that attorney fees could not be awarded to the
winning party except as specified by statute or pursuant to certain historic exceptions.
13

"
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manner, the burden of liability for unreasonable searches and
seizures appears more manageable. If they can gain an advantage from experience ratings, insurance companies should be
able to adjust their rates according, ultimately, to the quality
of police work. 9 Although police departments will pass the
costs along to the public, they will have a political incentive to
minimize those costs whenever possible. Thus, whether liability is covered by insurance or governmental reimbursement,
the costs would be placed on those who have control over the
practices which create them. To that degree the damage
awards might function as a deterrent." The tradition of imposing liability for fault does not change the picture. To limit
liability to bad faith when liability is placed on the government
further exempts from liability the fault of the agency in the
light of its knowledge of the problems and probable outcomes
of its rules and supervisory practices. 51 The harsh results that
would obtain from elimination of the good faith defense when
liability is placed on individuals would not be present if liability were spread through insurance or governmental reimbursement.

52

The Court specifically disapproved the award of attorney fees to those charging government officials with violation of constitutional rights via their disapproval of the private
"attorneys general" theory. Id: at 269. But see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), providing
counsel fees.
Injunctive relief is another alternative method of combating police misbehavior.
However, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court reversed the
district court, which had granted an injunction ordering certain improvements to be
made in the operation of the Philadelphia police department. The Court held that
injunctive relief will not be available unless plaintiffs can show not merely carelessness, poor practices, and lax supervision, but an actual conspiracy on the part of
several specifically identified officials to deny constitutional rights. Rulemaking had
prominent advocates, see Amsterdam, supra note 15, but was rejected as too meddlesome. See also Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
4' See G. CALABRESI, supra note 42, at 60-63.
Id. at 69. Whether we should prefer that the burden be placed on individuals
via experience ratings or on departments depends on who can best control the behavior
involved and the costs of trying to sanction misbehavior. The question of control turns
on the department's ability to determine and enforce rules and practices and to allocate resources. Id. at 161-73 and 254-55.
", But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Although there was a pattern of
abuse, the Court refused to enjoin remedial action. Such a holding is sound because
the agency can police itself better than the courts. Thus a damage action, rather than
an injunction, has the advantage of letting the department decide how best to handle
the problem. See R. POSNER, supra note 36.
52 Commentators have urged parallel expansion of "enterprise liability" when

1978-79]

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

This analysis suggests that the good faith defense is inconsistent with the assumption of liability coverage by the government or an insurance company since the goal of the fourth
amendment is deterrence. 53 Since a unitary rule is probably
both wise and necessary, it would be better to eliminate the
5
defense and encourage reimbursement.
CONCLUSION

Doubts about the utility of the tort remedy rest on the fear
that a hostile public would make recovery against police all but
impossible. Nevertheless, the argument that public hostility is
the reason to prefer the exclusionary rule to a tort remedy is
circular. The exclusionary rule has caused much of the public
hostility that would favor the police in tort actions. It wduld
surely be better to have a few wronged and innocent people
recover than to entrust the development of law in this area to
the criminal bar and thus perpetuate this hostility.
Basic to libertarian jurisprudence is acceptance of the reality that public sentiment is a factor to be considered. The court
may have to resist popular opinion but, as Hamilton argued,
such resistance should be'temporary; one can hardly expect it
to be permanent.5 Since a resolution is possible, one can be a
civil libertarian and still take account of the public's fears.5 6
there is substantial opportunity for the employer to minimize the risk of accidents. See
Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-OneStep Beyond Rowland
and Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 820, 829-33 (1975); Note, Continuingthe Common
Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of EnterpriseLiability to
Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 401, 403, 431-41 (1974).
Respondeat superior is often based on the greater ability of the employer to avoid
the error or accident. Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1211, 1214 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2237 (1978); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 281
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., dissenting); Krall v. Royall Inns of America, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 146, 150 (D. Alaska 1973); Phipp v. General Motors Corp. 363 A.2d 955,963 (Md.
1976).
"A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 78 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966).
However, one court has allowed the good faith defense to the government. See
Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 613 (1978).
See also Bertot v. School District No. 1, 47 U.S.L.W. 2336 (10th Cir., Nov. 15 1978).
See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
" The identification of such a fund could pose eleventh amendment problems. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Hutto v. Finney, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573-75
(1978).
"A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIsT PAPERS 78 (M. Beloff ed. 1948).
Wilson, Crime in the Streets, 5 PUBLic INTEREST 26, 35 (1966).

